Interpretation of Disability Insurance Policies - New England Life Insurance Co. v. Hurst by unknown
Maryland Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 19
Interpretation of Disability Insurance Policies -
New England Life Insurance Co. v. Hurst
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Insurance Law Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Interpretation of Disability Insurance Policies - New England Life Insurance Co. v. Hurst, 3 Md. L. Rev. 101 (1938)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol3/iss1/19
NEW ENG. L. INS. CO. v. HURST
ing career, the uniform contract was adopted. This offers
to those successfully completing two years teaching a ten-
ure relationship with the promise of retirement. The de-
cision of the Court tends to uphold this educational policy.
Any other result would, in effect, give the school board
the power to force a teacher out of the system. The choice
then open to the discharged teacher would be (1) to go
hungry for five or ten years without any pay, or (2) to
sue at once for breach of the entire contract and to recover
a judgment barring any further recovery, which would ter-
minate his connection with the school system. The whole
theory of the statutes regarding teachers and the pension
system is opposed to this idea that the school board has
any such power. It should not have the power to force
such a choice on a teacher.
INTERPRETATION OF DISABILITY
INSURANCE POLICIES
New England Life Insurance Co. v. Hurst'
Insurer-appellant issued two policies of life insurance
to insured-appellee. Each policy contained a supplemental
agreement providing for payment of a monthly income and
a waiver of premiums should the insured become "totally
and permanently" disabled. Insured became addicted to
alcohol, and through constant excessive use acquired the
disease known as acute or chronic alcoholism (also known
as delerium tremens or D. T.'s). For approximately five
months he was unable to attend to his own affairs and
spent part of that time as an inmate of a sanitarium for
treatment of his condition. Some seven months after the
onset of his disabling disease, insured regained his health
and began at once to work for a brokerage house, receiv-
ing from such occupation a fairly remunerative salary. In-
sured then claimed the monthly income which had accrued
during his period of disability, and brought suit to recover
the same after insurer disallowed the claim. The trial
court found for the insured, and insurer appealed. Held:
Affirmed.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals discussed each of
three points raised in the case. The first and most impor-
tant question concerned the meaning of the word "perma-
1199 At. 822 (Md. 1938).
1938]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
nent" as used in the policies. This question being one of
first impression in Maryland, the Court was forced to
decide between the two prevailing views held by other
appellate courts. The first, urged by insurer, gives the
word "permanent" an absolute meaning and refuses to
give relief for a "permanent" disability when it appears
that in actual fact the insured has recovered from his ill-
ness at the time of bringing suit.2  Such a view considers a
disability from which there has been a recovery as being
but "temporary."
Other courts which have decided this question give the
word "permanent" a relative meaning and say that the
insured may recover from a disability and still be said to
have been permanently disabled.3 This view was adopted
by the Maryland Court. In arriving at this conclusion the
Court reiterated the now familiar proposition in Mary-
land that contracts of insurance are to be construed as any
other contract and not necessarily against the insurer.'
However, the corollary of this proposition occurs when
there is an ambiguity in the contract or policy and any such
doubt is resolved so as to favor the insured or the party
who had no hand in drafting the contract.5 On this basis
the Court found an ambiguity in the insurer's policies and
applied the rule just stated.
This ambiguity lay in certain provisions of the agree-
ment which inferred that a "permanent" disability could
be terminated by recovery. One clause provided that the
payment of income and waiver of premiums should cease
2 See cases cited in opinion, particularly Ginell v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
237 N. Y. 554, 143 N. E. 740 (1923) ; Job v. Equitable Life, 133 Cal. App.
791, 22 P. (2d) 607 (1933) ; Metropolitan Life v. Blue, 222 Ala. 665, 133
So. 707, 79 A. L. R. 852 (1931); Hawkins v. John Hancock Ins. Co., 205
Iowa 760, 218 N. W. 313 (1928); Lewis v. Metropolitan Life, 142 So. 262
(La. 1932); Wetherall v. Equitable Life, 273 Mich. 580, 263 N. W. 745
(1935) ; Grenon v. Metropolitan Life, 52 R. I. 453, 161 Atl. 229 (1932) ;
Richards v. Metropolitan Life, 184 Wash. 595, 55 P. (2d) 1067 (1935).
Numerically at least, these cases adopting what is known as the New York
rule, seem to represent the weight of authority.
3 See cases cited in opinion, particularly Penn Mutual Life v. Milton, 160
Ga. 168, 127 S. E. 140 (1925); Maze v. Equitable Life, 188 Minn. 139, 246
N. W. 737 (1933); Laupeheimer v. Massachusetts Mutual, 224 Mo. App.
1018, 24 S. W. (2d) 1058 (1930), adversely noted (1930) 16 Va. L. Rev. 721;
Garden v. New England Mutual, 218 Iowa 1094, 254 N. W. 287 (1934);
Janney v. Scranton Life, 315 Pa. 200, 173 Atl. 189 (1934). Known as the
Georgia rule, these cases seem to constitute a minority view.
I Frontier Mortgage Corporation v. Heft, 146 Md. 1, 12, 125 Atl. 772
(1924); Brownstein v. New York Life Ins. Co., 158 Md. 51, 148 At. 273
(1930); American Casualty Co. v. Purcella, 163 Md. 434, 436, 163 At. 870
(1933).
1 McEvoy v. Security Fire Insurance.Co., 110 Md. 275, 73 Atl. 157 (1909);
Owens v. Graetzel, 146 Md. 361, 370, 126 At. 224 (1924).
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if the disability became "no longer permanent or total."
Also periodic examinations by the insurer were stipulated
for so as to ascertain the "continuance" of the permanent
disability. Such provisions, the Court felt, negatived the
idea that the word "permanent" should be taken in its
absolute sense, and rather conveyed the impression that its
relative meaning was meant.
Accordingly the Court concluded that permanent dis-
ability, as used in the policies, had no reference to the dura-
tion but rather to the quality and nature of the disability,
to be judged by "relevant evidence reasonably to establish
that it will not be of temporary duration." 6
The second point treated involved a determination of
whether the insured's condition could be said to be the
result of a "self-inflicted" injury so as to bar recovery,
within a clause of the policy providing against such a con-
tingency. Admitting that insured drank voluntarily, the
Court said that since the consequences of his acts were un-
known to him the resultant disease was not self-inflicted. 7
However, while denying that the alcoholism was self-in-
flicted in the instant case, the Court still refused to say that
such a "disease" could never be a "self-inflicted injury."
"If the evidence on this subject were such that rea-
sonable men might differ upon whether or not the
chronic alcoholism of the plaintiff was self-inflicted,
the question of intent would have been for the jury."
The question of what evidence would be sufficient to
conform to this dictum, of course, remains open. Quaere:
Would the insured's having once had and recovered from
the disease, so as to be apprised of his susceptibility, con-
stitute such evidence as would permit the question to go
to the jury.' Such a conclusion might be inferred from
the following language.
"Since the plaintiff here does not appear to have
had conscious knowledge of the danger that his drink-
ing might develop from a harmless indulgence into the
baneful disease of chronic alcoholism, the disease may
not be said to have been self-inflicted."
0 For a brief note on the principal case, with respect to this point only,
see (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 163.
A case similar to the principal one, both on the facts and the holding,
is New York Life v. Riggins, 178 Okla. 36, 61 Pac. (2d) 543, noted and
approved (1937) 22 Wash. U. L. Q. 288.
8See Globe Indemnity v. Reinhart, 152 M4. 439, 137 Atl. 43 (1927).
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The third question treated related to whether insured
should recover benefits dating from the beginning of the
disability or from the date of his furnishing proofs thereof.
The Court decided the question very cursorily, saying
that the language of the policies, (chiefly the heading" .
Income during total and permanent disability"), indicated
that recovery should date from the onset of the disability.
Although a number of cases have adopted this view,9 only
one case is cited by the Court in support of its conclusion. °
Again the Court left itself free to decide the other way if
given a proper case by saying that the policies in question
were "unlike those policies which diminish the period of
recovery by the time elapsed for furnishing proofs."
It might here be stated that several courts have decided
this question differently from the Maryland Court on pol-
icies of like wording."' The main basis of these decisions
seems to be an effort to prevent fabricated claims being
brought against insurers where the disability allegedly
ante-dates the proofs thereof.
The opinion in the case, on the first and main point of
the meaning of "permanently," is well reasoned and seems
functionally sound. To the average person having such
insurance, coverage to the extent here allowed would seem
to be contemplated by the policy. Insurers wishing to ex-
clude the protection afforded under this decision may do
so by explicit provisions in their policies. For that mat-
ter, such provisions could well be inserted to cover all the
difficulties this case involved.
9 Fidelity Mutual Life v. Gardner's Adm., 233 Ky. 88, 25 S. W. (2d) 69
(1930); Storwick v. Reliance Life, 151 Wash. 153, 275 P. 550 (1929); Old
Colony Life v. Julian, 175 Ark. 359, 299 S. W. 366 (1927).
10 National Life v. King, 102 Miss. 470, 59 So. 807 (1912).
"'Orr v. Mutual Life, 57 Fed. (2d) 901, affirmed in 64 Fed. (2d) 561
(1933); New England Mutual v. Reynolds, 217 Ala. 307, 116 So. 151, 59
A. L. R. 1075 (1928) ; Courson v. New York Life, 295 Pa. 518, 145 Atl. 530
(1929) ; Mutchnick v. John Hancock, 157 Misc. (N. Y.) 598, 284 N. Y. S. 565
(1935).
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